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Abstract—Intrusion Detection System (IDS) is one of the
most effective solutions for providing primary security services.
IDSs are generally working based on attack signatures or by
detecting anomalies. In this paper, we have presented AutoIDS,
a novel yet efficient solution for IDS, based on a semi-supervised
machine learning technique. AutoIDS can distinguish abnormal
packet flows from normal ones by taking advantage of cascading
two efficient detectors. These detectors are two encoder-decoder
neural networks that are forced to provide a compressed and
a sparse representation from the normal flows. In the test
phase, failing these neural networks on providing compressed
or sparse representation from an incoming packet flow, means
such flow does not comply with the normal traffic and thus it is
considered as an intrusion. For lowering the computational cost
along with preserving the accuracy, a large number of flows are
just processed by the first detector. In fact, the second detector
is only used for difficult samples which the first detector is not
confident about them. We have evaluated AutoIDS on the NSL-
KDD benchmark as a widely-used and well-known dataset. The
accuracy of AutoIDS is 90.17% showing its superiority compared
to the other state-of-the-art methods.
Index Terms—IDS, Security Services, Anomaly Detection, Ma-
chine Learning, Semi-supervised, Encoder-Decoder.
I. INTRODUCTION
NOWADAYS, providing security services in differentcomputer networks is an issue of paramount significance.
The principal security services required by almost all of the
communication networks, irrespective of their types, are con-
fidentiality, authenticity, non-repudiation, integrity, and avail-
ability. Cryptography is an effective solution for providing se-
curity services [1], however, it is ineffective against availability
attacks. IDS is an alternative solution to provide availability
as a crucial security service. Hence, IDS and cryptography
complement each other to cover all of the aforementioned
security services.
Intrusion detection methods can be generally categorized
into two groups: (1) signatures based, and (2) anomaly detec-
tion based [2]. The signature based methods can effectively
detect network attacks which have been already known and
their pattern is available, while they fail in detecting unknown
and also zero-day intrusions. The latter solution, i.e., anomaly
detection based, seems to be more effective due to its capabil-
ity of detecting unknown and new attacks. Machine learning
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Fig. 1. Visualizing the original normal (blue) and anomalous (red) packet
flows using t-SNE before and after representing by the sparse AE. (Left:)
original samples, (Right:) latent space of the sparse AE. As can be seen in
this figure, the sparse AE makes the original normal and abnormal packet
flows more separable from each other.
is one of the most promising techniques for anomaly detection
[3]. Furthermore, by the recent exponential growth in the vol-
ume of the computer network data, this technique attracts even
much more attention. Machine learning technique basically
falls into three categories, supervised, semi-supervised and
unsupervised.
The majority of the previously proposed methods for IDS
are based on supervised learning [4] meaning that they have
access to both normal and abnormal samples in training dura-
tion and they are able to efficiently learn the characteristics of
merely the available normal and abnormal flows. Accordingly,
such methods can accurately detect abnormal packet flows
only if they are available in training procedure (or be similar
to training samples), otherwise, they fail to properly detect
anomalies. Broadly, the generalization of supervised methods
for the IDS task is not enough to be able to detect new types
of attacks. Training an intrusion detection method in a semi-
supervised fashion, i.e., training a model just on the normal
traffic, without knowing anything about the abnormalities, is
more general especially for new (unseen) network attacks.
Handling this problem leads to a generalized method that is
able to act properly against new types of intrusions.
In this paper, we have proposed AutoIDS, a semi-supervised
deep learning method to precisely detect the anomalous traffic.
We have named it AutoIDS, since it exploits two Auto-
Encoders (AEs) for detecting anomalies in communication
networks in a cascade manner. The key idea is to make a
decision about the types of incoming network flows in two
separate phases, each phase with a different detector. In this
case, incoming network traffic is investigated in different
feature spaces enabling us to differentiate the process of
making decision about simply detectable and more complex
incoming packet flows. Thus, the accuracy of the detection
process is increased. Firstly, the sparse AE is exploited to
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2detect the simple detectable flows. Then, the rest of packet
flows are sent to a non-sparse AE. Thereby, distinguishing
normal flows from complex anomalies are performed by AE
with more accurate processing. From now on, for simplicity,
we use AE instead of non-sparse AE, in short. Cascading
several weak detectors and early rejection of the most samples
for improving the complexity and accuracy are widely used in
machine learning community [5], [6], especially for anomaly
detection in videos [7]–[9]. Inspired by such researches, we
have devised an effectual method for IDS.
In computer networks, the incoming network flows are
passing through a gateway. Therefore, they can be monitored at
this point. Since such network traffic is heavy, their processing
must be performed as fast as possible. To this end, a consid-
erable volume of incoming flows analyzed and detected in the
first step, i.e., by the sparse AE, with low time complexity. The
rest of the incoming network flows are then sent to the AE
with a more complicated decision making process. Note that
the number of packet flows forwarded to the second phase,
form a portion of the entire incoming traffic. Consequently, in
addition to increasing the accuracy of anomaly detection, the
time complexity is reduced noticeably.
We have interestingly investigated that the sparsity value of
a represented packet flow by the sparse AE as well as the
calculated reconstruction error for an incoming flow through
the AE which are trained merely on normal flows, are consid-
ered as two effective discriminative measures for hunting the
abnormal traffic in computer networks. Proposing an efficient
method to specify thresholds for both AE and sparse AE to
distinguish between normal and anomalous traffic, is of crucial
importance and accordingly forms part of our contribution.
Additionally, to show the effectiveness of AutoIDS, we have
investigated the power of the sparse AE to separate normal
and abnormal flows using t-distributed Stochastic NEighbor
(t-SNE) [10]. In fact, t-SNE is an algorithm for dimensionality
reduction which is appropriate for visualizing high dimen-
sional data. As an instance and by utilizing t-NSE, Fig. 1-left
shows the feature vector of original normal and anomalous
traffic, while Fig. 1-right shows the represented original packet
flows by the sparse AE, trained only on normal flows. In this
figure, there are 500 samples for each type of normal and
abnormal traffic. As can be seen in Fig 1, sparse representation
of the packet flows is more separable than the original version
of them. However, it is not sufficiently discriminative for
separating difficult samples and just works well for simple
ones. To cope with this weakness, as explained earlier, the
decision about difficult samples is taken by the AE, which
works based on the reconstruction error.
The main contribution of this paper is proposing a novel,
effective and accurate solution for detecting abnormal traf-
fic with an acceptable time complexity. More specifically,
our contributions are: (1) proposing a semi-supervised deep
learning method to detect anomalies with higher performance,
in terms of accuracy, compared to the other state-of-the-art
solutions. To the best knowledge of us, this paper is one of
the first deep learning based methods dealing with the intrusion
detection as an semi-supervised approach, and (2) evaluating
the proposed method under realistic circumstances and also
showing its superiority.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section
II, we have briefly reviewed the other proposed approaches. A
detailed explanation of AutoIDS has been provided in Section
III. Evaluation which includes experimental results alongside
their analysis resides in Section IV. Finally, we have concluded
this paper in Section V.
II. RELATED WORK
In this section, we have explored the intrusion detection
method based on machine learning technique. Generally, IDSs
can be divided into two groups: (1) signature based, and
(2) anomaly detection based. In signature-based solutions,
the incoming network traffic is compared with a database of
signatures. Therefore, this method needs a continuous update
in order to add new intrusion patterns. Although this way of
approaching the problem is efficient for detecting the known
attacks [11], it is incapable of detecting new (unseen) intru-
sions. On the other hands, anomaly detection based methods
are able to detect the unknown and zero-day network attacks.
In contrary to the signature based solutions, anomaly detection
based methods, which are broadly based on machine learning
technique, are more robust against unknown attacks [12]. From
the machine learning point of view, the anomaly detection
based methods can be categorized into three approaches: (1)
supervised, (2)semi-supervised, and (3) unsupervised [13]. In
supervised learning, sufficient amount of labeled data from
both normal traffic and the known intrusions are fed to the neu-
ral network. In this case, the system can detect such network
attacks more accurately. However, labeling all of the network
flows is a highly time-consuming and also expensive process.
Semi-supervised learning is used to utilize both labeled and
unlabeled data to decrease the cumbersome of labeling packet
flows, especially when the system faces a big volume of data
and diverse abnormal samples. Unsupervised learning aims to
cluster the samples with no knowledge.
There are many algorithms based on supervised learning
such as K-Nearest Neighbor (KNN) [14], neural network [15],
Support Vector Machine (SVM) [16], and etc. Chand et al.
[17] stacked a SVM, which is considered as an effective
classifier for intrusion detection, followed by another ones
such as BayesNet [18], AdaBoost [15], Logistic [19], IBK
[20], J48 [21], RandomForest [22], JRip [23], and OneR [24]
to improve the detection accuracy. Tao et al. [25] used the
Genetic Algorithm (GA) alongside the SVM. Basically, GA
can increase the true positive rate, decrease the error rate,
and improve the classification time complexity of the SVM
by selecting the best features. Ling et al. [26] introduced
a random forest feature selection algorithm and proposed a
multi-classifier method. The random forest extracts optimal
features for training SVM, decision tree, NaiveBayes [27], and
KNN classification algorithms. Then, deep learning is adopted
to stack these classifiers. This proposed method improves
the accuracy of intrusion detection in comparison with the
majoring voting algorithms. Ashfaq et al. [28] proposed a
fuzziness based semi-supervised learning approach to improve
the performance of classifiers for IDSs, however, it utilizes
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Fig. 2. The process of anomaly detection in AutoIDS. Incoming packet flows are processed in two phases. More complex flows which the sparse AE is not
confident about their types, are sent to the next phase. At this point, the AE makes a decision about the type of incoming traffic whether it is normal or not.
For AE, accuracy is preferred to speed while this is opposite for sparse AE. In the first step, τmin and τmax are the minimum and maximum threshold for
the sparse AE, respectively. Also, S(Z) shows the sparsity value. In the second step, LAE is the loss of AE which is calculated for each of incoming network
flows and thrAE is the threshold for separating the incoming traffic.
supervised learning. The proposed network has a single hidden
layer, and the output is a fuzzy membership network. Fuzzy
value is used for categorizing unlabeled samples. The classifier
is retrained after incorporating each category separately into
the original training set.
There are further literature works that have combined the
supervised and unsupervised approaches to propose hybrid al-
gorithms. Aljawarneh et al. [29] developed a new hybrid model
to minimize the time complexity of determining the feature
association impact scale. This hybrid algorithm consists of sev-
eral classifiers including J48, Meta Pagging [30], RandomTree
[31], REPTree [32], AdaBoostM1 [33], DecisionStump [34],
and NaiveBayes.
Deep learning as one of the most popular branches of
machine learning technique in the field of IDS, uses multi-
ple hidden layers in order to extract features, automatically.
However, machine learning based methods need an expert
to manually extract features. Deep learning based solutions
improve the detection accuracy compared to traditional meth-
ods [35]. Hodo et al. [13] presented a taxonomy including
shallow and deep neural networks for IDSs to demonstrate
the effect of feature selection and feature extraction on the
performance of the anomaly detection procedure. Javaid et
al. [36] proposed a deep learning method based on sparse
AE and softmax-regression to implement effective and flexible
Network Intrusion Detection System (NIDS). This technique
consists of two steps, (1) a sparse AE is used for feature
learning due to its ease of implementation and good perfor-
mance, and (2) softmax-regression is used for the classification
purpose. Farahnakian et al. [37] proposed an approach based
on a stacked AE. The whole neural network includes four
AEs in which the output of each AE is considered as an
input for the next AE, in the next layer. The stacked AE
is followed by a softmax layer classifying incoming network
flows into normal and anomaly. Shone et al. [38] proposed
a Non-symmetric Deep AE (NDAE) for unsupervised feature
learning and introduced the stacked NDAE and the random
forest for classification. This model is a combination of deep
and shallow learning to exploit their strengths and reduce
the analytical overhead. Papamartzivanos et al. [39] proposed
a methodology that combines self-taught learning [40] with
MAPE-K framework [41]. self-taught learning is utilized to
transfer learning from unlabeled data to achieve high attack
detection accuracy. Also, MAPE-K framework is used for
delivering a self-adaptive IDS to identify the previously unseen
intrusions via reconstructing of unlabeled data. The work of
[42] inspired by [43], proposed a semi-supervised method
based on deep generative method, where two deep neural
networks are adversarially and jointly trained to generate
abnormal flows and distinguish fake samples from the real
ones.
III. AUTOIDS ALGORITHM
In this section, we have introduced AutoIDS, the novel and
effective approach to detect anomalies in different types of
communication networks, with the aim of high accuracy and
low computational cost. To cope with the supervised weak-
nesses, i.e., low generalization for detecting the unseen attacks
and needed a numerous labeled samples, we have proposed
an effective method with minimum supervision which is able
to be efficiently trained by considering merely the normal
samples. The key idea is to exploit a combination of an AE
and a sparse AE in a cascade manner aiming to increase the
accuracy and decrease the time complexity, at the same time.
AutoIDS consists of two detectors, D1 and D2 including
sparse AE and AE, respectively. In D1, the criterion for
distinguishing normal from anomalies is the sparsity. In fact,
the sparse AE is trained only on normal traffic. Accordingly,
it is optimized to provide a sparse representation from normal
packet flows. Most probably anomalous traffic do not satisfy
the imposed constraint and the sparse AE needs more active
neurons to reconstruct the input, i.e., the sparsity value of their
latent representations is not lower than a specific threshold. To
reduce the overall complexity of AutoIDS, we have considered
D1 as a lightweight detector, and it is allowed to work with
high False Positive Rate (FPR). Flows whichD1 are not certain
about their types are sent to the next more accurate detector.
In D2, reconstruction error is used as the criterion for
separating different types of flows. Analogous with the sparse
AE, the AE is also trained just using normal traffic. Hence, it
4learns to minimize the reconstruction error. Accordingly, when
the reconstruction error of an incoming flow is more than a
predefined threshold, it does not satisfy the desired constraint
and thus it is considered as an anomaly. It is worth mentioning
that, considering two different detectors, i.e., D1 and D2,
empowers the system to make a decision about different types
of traffic in two individual feature spaces. In this way, AutoIDS
is able to differentiate normal traffic form anomalies with more
accuracy. Fig. 2 outlines our proposed solution for anomaly
detection in computer networks.
We have divided this section into three parts. The classifica-
tion manner employed by the sparse AE has been explained in
the first part. Then, we have presented a detailed explanation
about separating normal and anomalous traffic by the AE in
the second part. Finally, AE and sparse AE are considered as
a whole and the way of detecting anomalies by AutoIDS has
been investigated.
A. D1 : Sparsity Based Detector
Sparse AEs are originally used for unsupervised feature
learning while they improve generality [44]. However, we have
exploited the value of the sparsity in the latent representation
like what has been also considered as an effective solution in
[45]. The overall scheme of the sparse AE, which has been
used in our proposed method, is depicted in Fig. 3. As it is
clear in this figure, the sparse AE consists of two major parts,
encoder and decoder. Furthermore, to the latent representation
becomes over-complete, the number of neurons in the latent
representation (m) should be considered more than the size of
the input layer (n), i.e., m > n. The applied constraint on the
sparse AE during the training phase, is sparsity. As explained
previously, the sparse AE is merely trained on normal traffic.
Therefore, the sparse AE parameters (θSAE) are optimized
based the normal flows. The proposed spares AE for detecting
the anomalous packet flows is trained based on Equation 1.
LSAE = ‖X − Xˆ‖22 +
∑m
j=1KL(ρ‖ρˆj)
Xˆ = σ2(W2σ1(W1X + b1) + b2)
(1)
where X ∈ Rn is the characteristic set of each incoming
flow, Xˆ ∈ Rn is the characteristic set of the reconstructed
version of each incoming flow, σ1 and σ2 are activation
functions, W1 and W2 are encoder and decoder weight ma-
trices, respectively, b1 and b2 are bias terms, ρ is the sparsity
parameter, ρˆj is the expected value for j − th unit in hidden
layer and W1 ×X = Z ∈ Rm is the latent representation.
With respect to Equation 1, the sparse AE is trained to mini-
mize LSAE for normal flows and also produce Z whose sparsity
value, i.e., S(Z), is lower than ρ, where S(Z = D1(X)) is
the sparsity value of the representation of X using D1 network
and can be calculated based on the Equation 2.
S(Z) = # 6=0(Z)
m
(2)
Where # 6=0(Z) and m determine the total number of active
neurons (non-zero elements) and total number of neurons
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Fig. 3. The overall scheme of our proposed sparse AE. In this figure, X(i)j and
X
′(i)
j are the j − th feature of i− th sample and its reconstructed version,
respectively. H(i)j shows the j − th feature of the latent representation of
i− th sample. In AutoIDS n = 122 and m = 140.
(including active and inactive neurons) in Z, respectively.
As can be seen in Fig. 2, to speed up the decision making
process of AutoIDS about the incoming traffic, two thresholds
are determined in this phase, τmin and τmax. Flows with
S(Z) > τmax are detected as anomaly. On the contrary, when
an incoming flow follows the concept of normal traffic and
its sparsity value is lower than τmin, it is detected as normal.
Otherwise, i.e., τmin < S(Z) < τmax, the incoming packet
flow is considered as an unknown flow and thus it needs further
process due to lack of precision in D1. Although anomalies
are detected by D1 are not complicated, including both normal
and anomalous samples, their number is noticeable. In fact, a
large volume of incoming traffic are detected by D1 with low
time complexity.
B. D2 : Reconstruction Error Based Detector
AEs are mainly used for dimensionality reduction and
unsupervised feature learning [44]. However, as has also
been investigated in [46], leveraging the reconstruction error
is very useful. The overall architecture of our desired AE
is represented in Fig. 4. Unlike the sparse AE, the whole
structure of the AE is used to reconstruct the incoming flows.
In D2, the AE is forced to reconstruct only the normal flows
using a hidden layer with the lower number of neurons (k)
compared to the number of input neurons (n) in the training
phase (k < n). The loss function of AE is shown in Equation
3 called squared euclidean error. Note that the loss function
of AE is similar to sparse AE, but the sparsity constraint no
longer exists.
LAE = ‖X − Xˆ‖22 (3)
LAE is minimized for normal traffic and θAE, i.e., the
parameters vector of AE, is optimized on reconstructing the
incoming normal flows with low reconstruction error. In fact,
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Fig. 4. The overall scheme of our proposed AE. In this figure, X(i)j and
X
′(i)
j are the j − th feature of i− th sample and its reconstructed version,
respectively. H(i)j shows the j − th feature of the latent representation of
i− th sample. In AutoIDS n = 122 and k = 80.
we have aimed to exploit the lack of ability of the AE to
reconstruct incoming abnormal flows to distinguish different
types of traffic. Reconstruction error is calculated for all of the
incoming packet flows entering the AE. If it be lower than a
predetermined threshold (thrAE), the packet flow is considered
as normal, otherwise, it is detected as anomaly.
C. Training AutoIDS
In AutoIDS, D1 and D2 learn the concept of normal traffic,
individually. In other words, both of them are trained on all
of the normal packet flows included by the training set and
thus their learning process is not done according Fig. 2. D1
learns to provide a sparse representation from normal traffic.
Consequently, the number of active neurons in the hidden
layer should increase in case of facing anomalous samples.
Also, D2 is trained to provide a compressed representation of
normal flows. When an abnormal packet flow enters D2, it is
not capable of properly providing the reconstructed version.
Therefore, the reconstruction error increases which is the
criterion for distinguishing different types of incoming traffic
from each other.
D. Anomaly Detection
In this section, we have cohesively described the manner of
detecting anomalies in AutoIDS. Suppose an incoming flow
enters the computer network. At first, as it is shown in Fig. 2,
the incoming flow enters the sparse AE. Formal representation
of processing the incoming flow in the sparse AE is given as
follows.
D1(x) =

Normal, if S(Z) < τmin.
Anomaly, if S(Z) > τmax.
Unknown, otherwise.
A large amount of normal and anomalous flows, which
are not complicated, are detected in this phase. Accordingly,
Flows which their behavior are more complex, i.e., unknown
flows, are send to the next detector for further processing
irrespective of their actual types. This cascading method
results in increasing accuracy, while the time complexity is
reduced compared to each detector individually. The second
phase is shown in below.
D2(x ∈ Unknown) =
{
Anomaly, if LAE > thrAE.
Normal, otherwise.
The second phase is more complex and more precise.
Hence, it is suitable for distinguishing anomalies from normal
traffic in case that they are very similar to each other. The
point should be noticed is the way of determining thrAE. In
fact, this threshold is specified based on Receiver Operating
Characteristic (ROC) curve. The best threshold is the one
where recall is equal (roughly equal) to 1−fpr. If we consider
thrAE as the best threshold, then:
Recall(thrAE) ' 1− FPR(thrAE)
IV. EVALUATION
In this section, We have evaluated the performance of our
proposed method, i.e., AutoIDS, on NSL-KDD1 dataset [47].
We have compared the results of AutoIDS with the state-
of-the-art intrusion detection methods which are based on
anomaly detection. We have also expressed a comprehensive
analysis of the obtained results confirming that our method
is able to be performed as an effective method for intrusion
detection.
A. Dataset
KDDCUP’99 dataset is constructed based on DARPA’98
IDS evaluation program [48]. This dataset is provided by
Stolfo et al. [49]. A large number of duplicate records is
the fundamental problem of this dataset. Therefore, classifiers
had a bias toward the frequent records. Tavallaee et al. [47]
improved KDDCUP’99 by removing the duplicate records, and
named it NSL-KDD. Furthermore, the reasonable number of
samples in both training and test sets has enabled researchers
to use the entire dataset for the process of evaluation and
not to select them randomly. Thus, they are able to fairly
compare their results with other proposed methods. Each
of flows in NSL-KDD includes 41 features. Three of these
features are non-numeric values and the processing of such
features is not possible. To solve this issue, a pre-processing
for converting those three features to numerical type is needed
(See subsection IV-B).
NSL-KDD is composed of two subsets: (1) KDDTrain+
and, (2) KDDTest+. The available attack categories in this
dataset are (1) Denial of Service (DoS), (2) probing, (3) User
to Root (U2R), and (4) Root to Local (R2L). KDDTrain+
contains 24 attack types belonging to the above-mentioned ab-
normal classes. It is worth mentioning that, there are 17 attack
types in KDDTest+ which is not included by KDDTrain+. In
other words, the test process is performed on some malicious
flows (network intrusions) which certainly has not been got
involved in the training procedure. This characteristic leads to
1Available at https://www.unb.ca/cic/datasets/nsl.html
6TABLE I
THE SPECIFICATION OF THE NSL-KDD DATASET.
Number of Records
Category Class KDDTrain+ KDDTest+
Anomaly
DoS 45927 7458
Probing 11656 2421
R2L 995 2754
U2R 52 200
Normal — 67343 9711
Total — 125973 22544
examining the generalization of different proposed approaches
that use NSL-KDD for the evaluation process. Table I shows
the detailed information of the NSL-KDD dataset.
B. Pre-processing
As stated previously, since NSL-KDD contains non-
numerical values (protocol, service and flag), a prepossessing
is essential to process the entering flows. We have converted
these three features to numerical values using one-hot encod-
ing. For instance, three protocols are encoded as follows.
one-hot encoded =

(0, 0, 1), if the protocol is tcp.
(0, 1, 0), if the protocol is udp.
(1, 0, 0), if the protocol is icmp.
Services and flags are encoded in the same way. There are
three different protocols, 70 different services, 11 different
flags and 38 other numeric features. Accordingly, there are
122 features in total. After converting all columns (features)
to numerical values, standardization and also normalization
is needed to be ready for the training phase. Features are
standardized based on the Equation 4.
x(i) =
x(i)−mean(x(i))
standard deviation(x(i))
∀ i ∈ [1, 122]
(4)
Where x(i) is the standardized form of i − th feature.
Standardization procedure makes the mean and the standard
deviation of each feature equal to 0 and 1, respectively. Then,
normalization is done using the Equation 5.
x(i) =
x(i)−min(x(i))
max(x(i))−min(x(i))
∀ i ∈ [1, 122]
(5)
Where x(i) is the normalized form of i−th feature. Finally,
x(i) is fed to both encoder-decoder networks in the stage of
training.
TABLE II
AE AND SPARSE AE SPECIFICATIONS.
Parameters AE Sparse AE
Hidden layers 1 1
Hidden layer size (neurons) 80 140
Encoder activation function ReLU ReLU
Decoder activation function Sigmoid Sigmoid
Loss function MSE MSE
Optimizer Adam Adam
Regularizer – 10e-5
C. Implementation Details
We have implemented AutoIDS using Keras framework 2.
The evaluations are performed on GOOGLE COLAB3. The
detailed information and learning parameters of D1 and D2
are provided in Table II.
AutoIDS has been evaluated based on five measures, ac-
curacy (ACC), precision (PR), recall (RE), f-score (FS)
and false positive rate (FPR). These measures have been
calculated through the Equation 6.
ACC =
TP + TN
TP + FN + TN + FP
PR =
TP
TP + FP
RE =
TP
TP + FN
FS =
2 ∗ PR ∗RE
PR+RE
FPR =
FP
FN + FP
(6)
Where True Positive (TP) and False Negative (FN) refers
to those anomalous flows which are classified correctly as
anomaly and mistakenly as normal, respectively. Similarly,
the True Negative (TN) and False Positive (FP) are the
normal flows which are classified as normal and abnormal,
respectively.
D. Experimental Results
We have compared our proposed method, AutoIDS, with
the other state-of-the-art solutions. Also, the performance of
AutoIDS against changing the anomalous traffic ratio to the
normal traffic has been evaluated. Finally, We have investi-
gated the performance of each detector individually, in the
second part.
Comparison with the previous methods: We have com-
pared AutoIDS with methods reporting the result of 2-class
performance and uses the same dataset for the test phase,
2https://keras.io/
3https://colab.research.google.com
7TABLE III
AUTOIDS ACCURACY COMPARISON WHEN THE TRAINING PROCESS IS
PERFORMED ON KDDTRAIN+ AND THE TEST PROCEDURE IS DONE ON
KDDTEST+ .
Method Supervised Accuracy(%)
RNN-IDS [50] X 83.28
DCNN [51] X 85.00
Sparse AE and MLP [36] X 88.39
Random Tree [52] X 88.46
LSTM [51] X 89.00
Random Tree and NBTree [52] X 89.24
AE [53] 88.28
De-noising AE [53] 88.65
Ours (AutoIDS) 90.17
TABLE IV
DATA DISTRIBUTION OF TRAINING, VALIDATION AND TEST SETS.
KDDTrain+
Class Training Validation Test
Normal 53873 6735 6735
Anomaly — 6735 6735
i.e., KDDTest+. Table III shows that AutoIDS outperforms
the state-of-the-art anomaly detection based methods for IDS,
in terms of accuracy. Note that AutoIDS has a better perfor-
mance even in comparison with the methods using supervised
learning approach.
Regarding Table III and the characteristics of NSL-KDD
dataset, AutoIDS is more efficient for detecting unseen net-
work attacks. This superior performance has originated from
the feature of generalization. To showcase the generality of
AutoIDS, both training and test process are performed on
KDDTrain+. In this case, the test procedure is done on
anomalies which are most probably available in the training
set. Having learned all types of anomalous traffic, the neural
network gets familiar with their concept and then distinguishes
anomalies from normal flows more precisely. In this experi-
ment, KDDTrain+ is divide into three subsets, training set,
validation set and test set. The data distribution of these
subsets is represented in Table IV. Note that flows are selected
randomly for each subset.
Table V shows the accuracy of AutoIDS compared to the
other state-of-the-art approaches in Table III which also report
the accuracy of their proposed solution on KDDTrain+. In
fact, we need the other approaches evaluating their proposed
solution using both KDDTrain+ and KDDTest+, otherwise,
the generalization is not understood properly. Although Au-
toIDS has a better performance compared to the other semi-
supervised approaches [53], it is less accurate than supervised
ones. Supervised methods learn the concept of available in-
trusions in the training set. Obviously, when they face same
attack types in the test phase, separating incoming flows is
done more accurately. Table III along with Table V confirms
that AutoIDS outperforms the other solutions against new and
TABLE V
AUTOIDS PERFORMANCE COMPARISON WITH THE OTHER
STATE-OF-THE-ART SOLUTIONS WHEN BOTH TRAINING AND TEST PHASES
ARE PERFORMED ON KDDTRAIN+ . NOTE THAT KDDTEST+ IS NOT
USED.
Method ACC(%) PR(%) RE(%) FS(%)
AE [53] 93.62 91.39 96.33 93.80
De-noising AE [53] 94.35 94.26 94.43 94.35
Ours (AutoIDS) [53] 96.45 95.56 97.43 96.49
Sparse AE and MLP [36] 98.30 — — 98.84
RNN-IDS [50] 98.81 — — —
10 20 30 40 50
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Percentage of outliers (%)
F
-S
co
re
Ours (AutoIDS)
De-nosing AE [53]
AE [53]
Fig. 5. Comparisons of f-scores for different percentages of anomalous flows
involved in the experiment.
unknown attacks indicating the generalization of this method.
Generally, in the real world computer networks, abnormal
traffic constitutes a lower portion of total traffic. Hereupon,
we have evaluated AutoIDS using the f-score measure with
different test datasets when NSL-KDD is used. The amount
of anomalies is considered from 10 percent of the normal to
50 percent, with the step of 10. Fig. 5 shows that AutoIDS
outperforms the other two semi-supervised solutions in [53].
Ablation Study: Both D1 and D2 can be used for anomaly
detection separately, but exploiting both of them results in
gaining more accuracy. Table VI shows the performance of
AutoIDS when D1 and D2 work based on sparsity (S) and
reconstruction error (R) respectively, i.e., D[S]1 → D[R]2 . We
have also reported the performance of each detector individ-
ually as an efficient detector when they both work based on
reconstruction error, i.e., D[R]1 and D[R]2 .
Table VI shows that AutoIDS (D[S]1 → D[R]2 ) outperforms
D[R]1 and D[R]2 in terms of accuracy, recall and f-score.
AutoIDS processes incoming traffic in two steps. We have
concentrate on simple normal and anomalies in the step one,
while the decision about more complex traffic is made in the
next step. Hence, AutoIDS performs more precise compared
to each detector separately.
The computational cost for processing a packet flow is
also taken into account due to its significance for proposing
an appropriate solution. In fact, the time of processing an
incoming flow should not be the bottleneck as much as
8TABLE VI
AUTOIDS PERFORMANCE COMPARISON WITH EACH DETECTOR
INDIVIDUALLY WHEN THE TRAINING PROCESS IS PERFORMED ON
KDDTRAIN+ AND THE TEST PROCEDURE IS DONE ON KDDTEST+
AutoIDS (D[S]1 → D[R]2 ) D[R]2 D[R]1
ACC (%) 90.17 89.14 87.50
PR (%) 90.80 91.31 91.72
RE (%) 92.05 89.43 85.79
FS (%) 91.42 90.36 88.65
FPR (%) 12.33 11.25 10.24
TABLE VII
AVERAGE TEST TIME COMPARISON PER EACH INCOMING FLOW FOR
AUTOIDS AND EACH OF DETECTORS INDIVIDUALLY WHEN THE TRAINING
PROCESS IS PERFORMED ON KDDTRAIN+ AND THE TEST PROCEDURE IS
DONE ON KDDTEST+
AutoIDS (D[S]1 → D[R]2 ) 137 µsec
D[R]2 195 µsec
D[R]1 202 µsec
possible. Once again we have compared these approaches,
but this time in terms of time complexity in the test phase.
Table VII confirms that AutoIDS, i.e., D[S]1 → D[R]2 , can
effectively detect anomalies and it is faster than each of
detectors by a considerable margin. Since in AutoIDS all of
the incoming flows are just encoded by D1 and also a large
amount of normal and abnormal traffic are detected in the first
step, our proposed method achieve lower time complexity in
comparison with the other ones. In fact, all of incoming flows
are encoded and then decoded when each detector is used
individually and this way of approaching the problem makes
them slower.
Table. VI and Table. VII confirm the superiority of the idea
of composing AE and sparse AE which leads to improving
the performance in terms of accuracy and computational cost.
V. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have proposed a novel yet efficient semi-
supervised method based on AEs which is called AutoIDS.
AutoIDS takes advantage of cascading two encoder-decoder
neural networks forced to provide a compressed and a sparse
representation from normal traffic. These neural networks are
known as AE and sparse AE, respectively. In case that these
neural networks fail in providing the desire representations
for an incoming packet flow, it does not follow the concept
of normal traffic. The first detector, i.e., sparse AE, is faster
while the second one, i.e., AE, makes a decision about the
incoming packet flows more accurately. It is worth mentioning
that, a large number of incoming packet flows are processed
merely by the first detector. AutoIDS has been evaluated
comprehensively on the NSL-KDD dataset. Results confirm
the superiority of our method in comparison with the other
state-of-the-art approaches.
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